A commentary and critique of Gregory of Nazianzus’s Third Theological Oration (Oratio 29)

His arguments are generally not good, whether from a biblical or a logical point of view.

In this and the next post, I am going to present my own commentary and critique of Gregory of Nazianzus’s Third and Fourth Theological Orations (Orationes 29–30). In each case, I will post the text of Gregory’s oration, together with occasional comments of my own in bolded text wherever I have something to say.

It’s been a long time since I last read these orations. The conclusion I’ve come to now after reading through them again is that Gregory’s arguments are both exegetically and logically weak to very weak. He’s far from proving that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, even despite his evident and exaggerated self-confidence. Like so many other defenders of Christian “orthodoxy” throughout the ages, he has more bluster and self-assurance than actual arguments.

I therefore judge that, for all his popularity, he is not a reliable guide for making sense of what the New Testament teaches about Jesus or for knowing whether the doctrine of the Trinity is coherent. He’s at best of historical interest to persons who want to know about the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity, or else of devotional interest to people who already agree with him and don’t particularly care about whether his arguments do prove his point.

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I. This then is what might be said to cut short our opponents’ readiness to argue and their hastiness with its consequent insecurity in all matters, but above all in those discussions which relate to God. But since to rebuke others is a matter of no difficulty whatever, but a very easy thing, which any one who likes can do; whereas to substitute one’s own belief for theirs is the part of a pious and intelligent man; let us, relying on the Holy Ghost, Who among them is dishonoured, but among us is adored, bring forth to the light our own conceptions about the Godhead, whatever these may be, like some noble and timely birth. 

SN: This is a good point. A person is always more convincing when he not only critiques but also constructs. People need something to believe. It’s not enough simply to be told what’s wrong.

Not that I have at other times been silent; for on this subject alone I am full of youthful strength and daring; but the fact is that under present circumstances I am even more bold to declare the truth, that I may not (to use the words of Scripture) by drawing back fall into the condemnation of being displeasing to God. And since every discourse is of a twofold nature, the one part establishing one’s own, and the other overthrowing one’s opponents’ position; let us first of all state our own position, and then try to controvert that of our opponents — and both as briefly as possible, so that our arguments may be taken in at a glance (like those of the elementary treatises which they have devised to deceive simple or foolish persons), and that our thoughts may not be scattered by reason of the length of the discourse, like water which is not contained in a channel, but flows to waste over the open land.

II. The three most ancient opinions concerning God are Anarchia, Polyarchia, and Monarchia. The first two are the sport of the children of Hellas, and may they continue to be so. For Anarchy is a thing without order; and the Rule of Many is factious, and thus anarchical, and thus disorderly. For both these tend to the same thing, namely disorder; and this to dissolution, for disorder is the first step to dissolution.

But Monarchy is that which we hold in honour. It is, however, a Monarchy that is not limited to one Person, for it is possible for Unity if at variance with itself to come into a condition of plurality; but one which is made of an equality of Nature and a Union of mind, and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity — a thing which is impossible to the created nature — so that though numerically distinct there is no severance of Essence. Therefore Unity having from all eternity arrived by motion at Duality, found its rest in Trinity. This is what we mean by Father and Son and Holy Ghost. 

SN: Gregory says that the monarchy is “not limited to one person.” Thus, there is not a monarchy simply because God the Father is above the Son and Holy Spirit. Rather, there’s a monarchy of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together.

Why is it a “monarchy,” even though there is a plurality of persons? Because there is “an equality of nature and union of mind, and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity—a thing which is impossible to the created nature—so that though numerically distinct there is no severance of essence.”

There are two ways to interpret this. On the one hand, there can be a monarchy of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit because, although distinct from each other and characterized by their own individual properties, they are nevertheless perfectly harmonized so as to act as though a single thing. On the one hand, there can be a monarchy of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit because there is between them only one nature, one mind, and one action, and they are all the distinct subjects of that one nature, mind, and action.

Because it’s possible for created things to be in harmony and act as one, even though they are distinct from each other, and because Gregory says that the kind of monarchy that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit enjoy is “impossible to the created nature,” it may be best to interpret him according to the second way. There is only one nature, one mind, one action, of which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are somehow all the subjects. But we will see later that he contradicts this point, at least implicitly.

The Father is the Begetter and the Emitter; without passion of course, and without reference to time, and not in a corporeal manner. The Son is the Begotten, and the Holy Ghost the Emission; for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things.

SN: Notice that Gregory paints the picture of a kind of triangle, with the Father as the point on top and the Son and Holy Spirit as the two points on the bottom. The Father begets the Son and emits the Holy Spirit. The Son comes from the Father by means of begetting, and the Holy Spirit comes the Father by means of emitting.

For we shall not venture to speak of an overflow of goodness, as one of the Greek Philosophers dared to say, as if it were a bowl overflowing, and this in plain words in his Discourse on the First and Second Causes. Let us not ever look on this Generation as involuntary, like some natural overflow, hard to be retained, and by no means befitting our conception of Deity. Therefore let us confine ourselves within our limits, and speak of the Unbegotten and the Begotten and That which proceeds from the Father, as somewhere God the Word Himself says.

SN: Gregory denies that the begetting of the Son and emission of the Spirit are a matter of an “overflow of goodness.” Neither are these processes “involuntary,” as though the Father couldn’t help himself. He limits himself to using these words: “begetting” and “proceeding.” The implication of Gregory’s reasoning is that the relations that obtain between Father, Son, and Spirit are unique, not comparable to anything found within the created order.

III. When did these come into being? They are above all When.

SN: In other words, none of this happened at any time. It’s simply always been the case. It’s true at every time.

But, if I am to speak with something more of boldness — when the Father did. And when did the Father come into being. There never was a time when He was not. And the same thing is true of the Son and the Holy Ghost. Ask me again, and again I will answer you, When was the Son begotten? When the Father was not begotten. And when did the Holy Ghost proceed? When the Son was, not proceeding but, begotten — beyond the sphere of time, and above the grasp of reason; although we cannot set forth that which is above time, if we avoid as we desire any expression which conveys the idea of time. For such expressions as when and before and after and from the beginning are not timeless, however much we may force them; unless indeed we were to take the Æon, that interval which is coextensive with the eternal things, and is not divided or measured by any motion, or by the revolution of the sun, as time is measured.

SN: In other words, the Father timelessly begets the Son and timelessly emits the Spirit. It’s not a process that takes time or was completed in time.

How then are They not alike unoriginate, if They are coeternal? Because They are from Him, though not after Him. For that which is unoriginate is eternal, but that which is eternal is not necessarily unoriginate, so long as it may be referred to the Father as its origin. Therefore in respect of Cause They are not unoriginate; but it is evident that the Cause is not necessarily prior to its effects, for the sun is not prior to its light. And yet They are in some sense unoriginate, in respect of time, even though you would scare simple minds with your quibbles, for the Sources of Time are not subject to time.

SN: The Son and Spirit are not “unoriginate” because the Father is their cause. The Father alone is without cause and thus “unoriginate” in the strict sense. Yet the Father is their cause in a completely timeless way. He did not begin to be their cause at any point in time, nor did he ever complete a process of causing them. He simply always timelessly is the cause of the Son and Spirit.

IV. But how can this generation be passionless? In that it is incorporeal. For if corporeal generation involves passion, incorporeal generation excludes it.

SN: This is a logically invalid inference. It may be that what makes it so that generation involves passion is not the fact that it’s corporeal but the fact that it’s generation. In that case, both corporeal and incorporeal generation would involve passion. Gregory must show that generation can be passionless in principle, but here he simply takes the point for granted.

And I will ask of you in turn, How is He God if He is created? For that which is created is not God. 

SN: Here Gregory takes for granted a premise that earlier generations of thinkers did not. He says that a thing is not “god” if it is created. But this is not adequate to ancient Greek notions of deity, nor to ancient Hebrew ideas (e.g., Exod. 7:1; Ps. 82), nor to primitive Christian ideas (e.g., Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 124; Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.38.3).

I refrain from reminding you that here too is passion if we take the creation in a bodily sense, as time, desire, imagination, thought, hope, pain, risk, failure, success, all of which and more than all find a place in the creature, as is evident to every one. Nay, I marvel that you do not venture so far as to conceive of marriages and times of pregnancy, and dangers of miscarriage, as if the Father could not have begotten at all if He had not begotten thus; or again, that you did not count up the modes of generation of birds and beasts and fishes, and bring under some one of them the Divine and Ineffable Generation, or even eliminate the Son out of your new hypothesis. And you cannot even see this, that as His Generation according to the flesh differs from all others (for where among men do you know of a Virgin Mother?), so does He differ also in His spiritual Generation; or rather He, Whose Existence is not the same as ours, differs from us also in His Generation.

SN: In other words, God is a different sort of thing than any creature. For that reason, the generation of the Son by the Father is without parallel or analogy in the created order. It’s an utterly unique reality.

V. Who then is that Father Who had no beginning? One Whose very Existence had no beginning; for one whose existence had a beginning must also have begun to be a Father. He did not then become a Father after He began to be, for His being had no beginning.

SN: In other words, the Father’s existence and the Father’s being a father are the same. He does not first exist and later become Father, but simply always exists and always is Father.

And He is Father in the absolute sense, for He is not also Son; just as the Son is Son in the absolute sense, because He is not also Father. These names do not belong to us in the absolute sense, because we are both, and not one more than the other; and we are of both, and not of one only; and so we are divided, and by degrees become men, and perhaps not even men, and such as we did not desire, leaving and being left, so that only the relations remain, without the underlying facts.

But, the objector says, the very form of the expression He begot and He was begotten, brings in the idea of a beginning of generation. But what if you do not use this expression, but say, He had been begotten from the beginning so as readily to evade your far-fetched and time-loving objections?

SN: Gregory is simply confused here. The perfect and pluperfect tenses express completed actions. The passive voice typically expresses a relation to an agent. An action can’t be completed if it isn’t at some earlier moment in process, and if it’s ever in process, then it takes place in time. Thus, to use the perfect or pluperfect tenses to refer to the Son’s begetting is to imply that that begetting takes place in time. One can’t simply do away with the problem by adding the prepositional phrase “from the beginning.” If the Son stands in a certain relation to the Father from the beginning of time, then he’s always in that relation. And if he’s always in that relation, then there never was a time when that relation was in the process of being completed. And if it was never in the process of being completed, then it’s not a completed process. And if it’s not a completed process, then it can’t be referred to using the perfect or pluperfect tenses. One uses other tenses to refer to things which are always and everywhere the case, e.g. the present (or, in Greek, the aorist).

Will you bring Scripture against us, as if we were forging something contrary to Scripture and to the truth? Why, every one knows that in practice we very often find tenses interchanged when time is spoken of; and especially is this the custom of Holy Scripture, not only in respect of the past tense, and of the present; but even of the future, as for instance Why did the heathen rage? when they had not yet raged and they shall cross over the river on foot, where the meaning is they did cross over. It would be a long task to reckon up all the expressions of this kind which students have noticed.

SN: This is a non sequitur. Sometimes the Bible speaks about things that haven’t happened yet as though they have, because they will. This is normal even in contemporary English, as when we say that a certain team has won a game, even though the game isn’t over yet, because they’ve made it impossible for the other team to win. But the objection Gregory is considering is that to say that the Father begat the Son or that the Son was begotten by the Father is to refer to a completed process and thus to imply procession and temporality. In other words, it’s not as though anything goes. Gregory should show that the Bible sometimes speaks of things are timelessly related to each other as though the relation were the result of the completion of a process. Good luck with that!

VI. So much for this point. What is their next objection, how full of contentiousness and impudence? He, they say, either voluntarily begot the Son, or else involuntarily. Next, as they think, they bind us on both sides with cords; these however are not strong, but very weak. For, they say, if it was involuntarily He was under the sway of some one, and who exercised this sway? And how is He, over whom it is exercised, God? But if voluntarily, the Son is a Son of Will; how then is He of the Father? — and they thus invent a new sort of Mother for him — the Will — in place of the Father. There is one good point which they may allege about this argument of theirs; namely, that they desert Passion, and take refuge in Will. For Will is not Passion.

Secondly, let us look at the strength of their argument. And it were best to wrestle with them at first at close quarters. You yourself, who so recklessly assert whatever takes your fancy; were you begotten voluntarily or involuntarily by your father? If involuntarily, then he was under some tyrant’s sway (O terrible violence!) and who was the tyrant? You will hardly say it was nature, — for nature is tolerant of chastity. If it was voluntarily, then by a few syllables your father is done away with, for you are shown to be the son of Will, and not of your father. But I pass to the relation between God and the creature, and I put your own question to your own wisdom. Did God create all things voluntarily or under compulsion? If under compulsion, here also is the tyranny, and one who played the tyrant; if voluntarily, the creatures also are deprived of their God, and you before the rest, who invent such arguments and tricks of logic. For a partition is set up between the Creator and the creatures in the shape of Will. And yet I think that the Person who wills is distinct from the Act of willing; He who begets from the Act of begetting; the Speaker from the speech, or else we are all very stupid. On the one side we have the mover, and on the other that which is, so to speak, the motion. Thus the thing willed is not the child of will, for it does not always result therefrom; nor is that which is begotten the child of generation, nor that which is heard the child of speech, but of the Person who willed, or begot, or spoke. 

SN: This argument of Gregory’s seems good. One might question it as follows. Within the created sphere, a thing is never the result of only one cause. It’s not simply my willing, but also my body’s moving along with my willing, and my external circumstances’ being favorable, etc. that contribute to my effect’s coming about. Thus, one could fairly say that any effect I produce is not merely an effect of me but of me together with everything else that was in existence at that time, since everything is connected to and affected by everything else. In that case, what about Christ’s being begotten of the Father? If he’s begotten by the Father voluntarily, then it’s not just the Father but the Father together with his act of will that brings about the Son’s existence. This requires proposing a kind of composition into the Father.

But the things of God are beyond all this, for with Him perhaps the Will to beget is generation, and there is no intermediate action (if we may accept this altogether, and not rather consider generation superior to will).

SN: Once again, Gregory proposes that God is a different sort of thing than any creature, so that the ordinary logic doesn’t apply to him. 

VII. Will you then let me play a little upon this word Father, for your example encourages me to be so bold? The Father is God either willingly or unwillingly; and how will you escape from your own excessive acuteness? If willingly, when did He begin to will? It could not have been before He began to be, for there was nothing prior to Him. 

SN: Here Gregory notes that the Father is absolutely prior to everything else.

Or is one part of Him Will and another the object of Will? If so, He is divisible.

SN: The common assumption in Gregory’s time was that God is indivisible and absolutely simple.

So the question arises, as the result of your argument, whether He Himself is not the Child of Will. And if unwillingly, what compelled Him to exist, and how is He God if He was compelled — and that to nothing less than to be God? 

SN: Gregory’s argument presents a false dilemma. God does not exist willingly in the sense that he doesn’t bring himself into existence, but neither does he exist unwillingly in the sense that he’s not brought into existence by something else against his own will. God rather exists apart from will in the sense that his existence is necessary and definitive of who he is. He can’t not exist. His existing is prior to anything he wills.

How then was He begotten, says my opponent. How was He created, if as you say, He was created? For this is a part of the same difficulty. Perhaps you would say, By Will and Word. You have not yet solved the whole difficulty; for it yet remains for you to show how Will and Word gained the power of action. For man was not created in this way.

VIII. How then was He begotten? This Generation would have been no great thing, if you could have comprehended it who have no real knowledge even of your own generation, or at least who comprehend very little of it, and of that little you are ashamed to speak; and then do you think you know the whole? 

SN: In other words, if his opponents can’t say how they’ve come into existence by God as creatures, it’s no surprise that it can’t be explained how the Son is generated by the Father. Both creation and generation are mysterious processes.

For my part, I have an answer to this question. The creature comes about in God just a person forms a fist by flexing his muscles and imposing a certain shape on the matter of his hand. The creature is a shape that God imposes on himself in an act of self-affecting.

You will have to undergo much labour before you discover the laws of composition, formation, manifestation, and the bond whereby soul is united to body — mind to soul, and reason to mind; and movement, increase, assimilation of food, sense, memory, recollection, and all the rest of the parts of which you are compounded; and which of them belongs to the soul and body together, and which to each independently of the other, and which is received from each other. For those parts whose maturity comes later, yet received their laws at the time of conception. Tell me what these laws are? And do not even then venture to speculate on the Generation of God; for that would be unsafe. For even if you knew all about your own, yet you do not by any means know about God’s. And if you do not understand your own, how can you know about God’s? For in proportion as God is harder to trace out than man, so is the heavenly Generation harder to comprehend than your own.

SN: In other words, God is a different sort of thing than any creature. Therefore, we can’t expect to understand how things stand with him, especially if we don’t even understand how they are with us.

But if you assert that because you cannot comprehend it, therefore He cannot have been begotten, it will be time for you to strike out many existing things which you cannot comprehend; and first of all God Himself.

SN: This is not exactly right. The objection considered just a moment ago was that the Father can’t have timelessly begotten the Son because “begotten” implies a completed process and thus temporality. It’s not that Gregory’s position can’t be understood as a matter of contingent fact. It’s rather that his position is incoherent. He is trying to talk about something timeless using words that invariably imply temporality. There are no words for saying what he’s trying to say, in a sense. And in that case, he can’t say what he believes.

For you cannot say what He is, even if you are very reckless, and excessively proud of your intelligence.

SN: I think it’s not so hard to say what God is. He is that which possesses the fundamental ontological condition in an original rather than derivative manner. By “fundamental ontological condition,” I mean that which distinguishes a thing from absolute nothingness. By “original rather than derivative manner,” I mean that God possesses that condition simply because of what he is and not because of anything else’s action upon him.

First, cast away your notions of flow and divisions and sections, and your conceptions of immaterial as if it were material birth, and then you may perhaps worthily conceive of the Divine Generation. How was He begotten?— I repeat the question in indignation. The Begetting of God must be honoured by silence. It is a great thing for you to learn that He was begotten. But the manner of His generation we will not admit that even Angels can conceive, much less you. Shall I tell you how it was? It was in a manner known to the Father Who begot, and to the Son Who was begotten. Anything more than this is hidden by a cloud, and escapes your dim sight.

SN: Gregory’s argument here is not convincing. He asserts that the Father begets the Son, but refuses to answer how this is supposed to be. He says it’s a mystery. The real question would be: Why should anyone accept Gregory’s position in the first place? If the arguments in its favor are so good as to be unavoidable, then perhaps the appeal to mystery is the best one can do. But if the arguments aren’t so good, then Gregory’s appeal to mystery is highly unconvincing. Why prefer an unintelligible account to an intelligible one, if the arguments for the former aren’t so good?

IX. Well, but the Father begot a Son who either was or was not in existence.

SN: In other words, if the Father begat the Son, then previously the Son didn’t exist. That would imply that there’s a time when the Son didn’t exist.

What utter nonsense! This is a question which applies to you or me, who on the one hand were in existence, as for instance Levi in the loins of Abraham; and on the other hand came into existence; and so in some sense we are partly of what existed, and partly of what was nonexistent; whereas the contrary is the case with the original matter, which was certainly created out of what was non-existent, notwithstanding that some pretend that it is unbegotten.

SN: For Gregory, we are not created entirely ex nihilo, since we are made from matter that preexists. But the material cosmos itself was created ex nihilo and did not preexist its own creation in any sense.

But in this case to be begotten, even from the beginning, is concurrent with to be. On what then will you base this captious question? 

SN: In other words, for the Son, being and being-begotten are the same. His being simply is being-begotten. 

I would complain that Gregory is identifying being with a particular mode of being. Being is one thing, and being-in-a-particular-mode is always another. All specific modes of being are possibilities of being considered on its own, potentialities contained within being which it may actualize for itself. But this means there’s always a distinction between being and being-in-a-particular-mode. And because there’s this distinction, there’s need of causes and the procession of time to explain how being-in-a-particular-mode arises out of being.

For what is older than that which is from the beginning, if we may place there the previous existence or non-existence of the Son? In either case we destroy its claim to be the Beginning. Or perhaps you will say, if we were to ask you whether the Father was of existent or non-existent substance, that he is twofold, partly pre-existing, partly existing; or that His case is the same with that of the Son; that is, that He was created out of non-existing matter, because of your ridiculous questions and your houses of sand, which cannot stand against the merest ripple.

I do not admit either solution, 

SN: In other words, the Son was not begotten from what existed, nor from what did not exist. 

and I declare that your question contains an absurdity, and not a difficulty to answer. If however you think, in accordance with your dialectic assumptions, that one or other of these alternatives must necessarily be true in every case, let me ask you one little question: Is time in time, or is it not in time? If it is contained in time, then in what time, and what is it but that time, and how does it contain it? But if it is not contained in time, what is that surpassing wisdom which can conceive of a time which is timeless? Now, in regard to this expression, I am now telling a lie, admit one of these alternatives, either that it is true, or that it is a falsehood, without qualification (for we cannot admit that it is both). But this cannot be. For necessarily he either is lying, and so is telling the truth, or else he is telling the truth, and so is lying. What wonder is it then that, as in this case contraries are true, so in that case they should both be untrue, and so your clever puzzle prove mere foolishness? Solve me one more riddle. Were you present at your own generation, and are you now present to yourself, or is neither the case? If you were and are present, who were you, and with whom are you present? And how did your single self become thus both subject and object? But if neither of the above is the case, how did you get separated from yourself, and what is the cause of this disjoining? But, you will say, it is stupid to make a fuss about the question whether or no a single individual is present to himself; for the expression is not used of oneself but of others. Well, you may be certain that it is even more stupid to discuss the question whether That which was begotten from the beginning existed before its generation or not. For such a question arises only as to matter divisible by time.

But they say, The Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father. It is clear, without saying so, that this line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from the Godhead. For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the Unbegotten is excluded. What argument can contradict this? Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a blasphemy. 

SN: I don’t see the force of Gregory’s argument here. To be unbegotten is the essence of God, and therefore the begotten is eo ipso not God, at least not in the strict sense. But it is well-known that things less than God in the ultimate sense could nevertheless be called “God” in a secondary, derivative sense, as I mentioned earlier. Gregory seems either not to know this or else to ignore it out of expediency.

In the next place, in what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same? If you mean that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same nature. But if you say that He That begot and That which is begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate. For it is in fact a necessary truth that they are the same. For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent.

SN: Gregory’s argument is simply invalid. The king of Israel (Ps. 2:7) and the people of Israel (Exod. 4:22; Hos. 11:1) are said to be begotten by God and his child. Yet they are also creatures. Thus, to be begotten by God and his child is compatible with being a creature. Among creatures, a child in the ordinary sense is normally the same sort of thing as its parent. But even the relation of parenthood can be ascribed metaphorically, e.g. “necessity is the mother of invention.”

Or we may argue thus again. What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same? For example, Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the essence. Are immortality and innocence and immutability also the essence of God? If so God has many essences and not one; or Deity is a compound of these. For He cannot be all these without composition, if they be essences.

SN: Gregory’s assertion seems to be that neither “being unbegotten” nor “being begotten” go into the essence of God. Even so, he cannot avoid ascribing composition to God. A single person may be both wise and unwise, but that’s because there’s a part of him that’s wise and another that’s not. If unbegottenness and begottenness are both ascribed to the same God, then that God must be composite, having an unbegotten part and a begotten part. So even if there is not composition at the level of essence, there’s still composition at the level of the person. Each person would be a composite of the shared divine essence plus his own personal property. 

XI. They do not however assert this, for these qualities are common also to other beings. But God’s Essence is that which belongs to God alone, and is proper to Him. But they, who consider matter and form to be unbegotten, would not allow that to be unbegotten is the property of God alone (for we must cast away even further the darkness of the Manichæans). But suppose that it is the property of God alone. What of Adam? Was he not alone the direct creature of God? Yes, you will say. Was he then the only human being? By no means. And why, but because humanity does not consist in direct creation? For that which is begotten is also human. Just so neither is He Who is Unbegotten alone God, though He alone is Father.

SN: Gregory’s position obviously implies polytheism. If Adam is directly created but not the only human being, because other human beings came around who were not directly created, then there are multiple human beings. If the Father is God but unbegotten, and the Son is God but begotten, then there are two Gods, Father and Son. That’s what Gregory’s position implies.

But grant that He Who is Begotten is God; for He is of God, as you must allow, even though you cling to your Unbegotten. Then how do you describe the Essence of God? Not by declaring what it is, but by rejecting what it is not. For your word signifies that He is not begotten; it does not present to you what is the real nature or condition of that which has no generation. What then is the Essence of God?

SN: The question isn’t hard to answer. If the essence of God is to be unbegotten, and if everything’s essence stipulates its existence rather than its non-existence, then the essence of God is unbegotten existence, i.e. self-existence. 

It is for your infatuation to define this, since you are so anxious about His Generation too; but to us it will be a very great thing, if ever, even in the future, we learn this, when this darkness and dulness is done away for us, as He has promised Who cannot lie. This then may be the thought and hope of those who are purifying themselves with a view to this. Thus much we for our part will be bold to say, that if it is a great thing for the Father to be Unoriginate, it is no less a thing for the Son to have been Begotten of such a Father. For not only would He share the glory of the Unoriginate, since he is of the Unoriginate, but he has the added glory of His Generation, a thing so great and august in the eyes of all those who are not altogether grovelling and material in mind.

XII. But, they say, if the Son is the Same as the Father in respect of Essence, then if the Father is unbegotten, the Son must be so likewise. Quite so — if the Essence of God consists in being unbegotten; and so He would be a strange mixture, begottenly unbegotten. If, however, the difference is outside the Essence, how can you be so certain in speaking of this? Are you also your father’s father, so as in no respect to fall short of your father, since you are the same with him in essence?

SN: It’s clear to me that by asserting that Father and Son have the same essence and that the one begets the other, Gregory is positing two Gods.

Is it not evident that our enquiry into the Nature of the Essence of God, if we make it, will leave Personality absolutely unaffected? But that Unbegotten is not a synonym of God is proved thus. 

SN: Novatian certainly seemed to think so. He argues that there is only one God because the Father is unbegotten while the Son was begotten: “For if [the Son] had not been born—compared with Him who was unborn [i.e., the Father], an equality being manifested in both—He would make two unborn beings, and thus would make two Gods.” See On the Trinity 31.

If it were so, it would be necessary that since God is a relative term, Unbegotten should be so likewise; or that since Unbegotten is an absolute term, so must God be....God of no one. For words which are absolutely identical are similarly applied. 

SN: If “God” is a relative term, and if what is not-God is created, as Gregory said earlier, then there is no God without a creation. Thus, if the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not create, they are not God. If the Father doesn’t create the Son and Spirit, then he’s not their God. So without creation, there’s no God.

But the word Unbegotten is not used relatively. For to what is it relative? And of what things is God the God? Why, of all things. How then can God and Unbegotten be identical terms? And again, since Begotten and Unbegotten are contradictories, like possession and deprivation, it would follow that contradictory essences would co-exist, which is impossible. Or again, since possessions are prior to deprivations, and the latter are destructive of the former, not only must the Essence of the Son be prior to that of the Father, but it must be destroyed by the Father, on your hypothesis.

XIII. What now remains of their invincible arguments? Perhaps the last they will take refuge in is this. If God has never ceased to beget, the Generation is imperfect; and when will He cease? But if He has ceased, then He must have begun. Thus again these carnal minds bring forward carnal arguments. Whether He is eternally begotten or not, I do not yet say, until I have looked into the statement, Before all the hills He begets Me, more accurately. But I cannot see the necessity of their conclusion. For if, as they say, everything that is to come to an end had also a beginning, then surely that which has no end had no beginning. What then will they decide concerning the soul, or the Angelic nature? If it had a beginning, it will also have an end; and if it has no end, it is evident that according to them it had no beginning.

SN: The argument was not that everything that has a beginning has an end, but that everything that ends (or is completed) has a beginning. Gregory’s response here is a red herring.

But the truth is that it had a beginning, and will never have an end. Their assertion, then, that which will have an end had also a beginning, is untrue.

SN: This is a blatant non sequitur.

Our position, however, is, that as in the case of a horse, or an ox, or a man, the same definition applies to all the individuals of the same species, and whatever shares the definition has also a right to the Name; so in the very same way there is One Essence of God, and One Nature, and One Name; although in accordance with a distinction in our thoughts we use distinct Names and that whatever is properly called by this Name really is God; and what He is in Nature, That He is truly called — if at least we are to hold that Truth is a matter not of names but of realities. But our opponents, as if they were afraid of leaving any stone unturned to subvert the Truth, acknowledge indeed that the Son is God when they are compelled to do so by arguments and evidences; but they only mean that He is God in an ambiguous sense, and that He only shares the Name.

SN: Gregory’s position is unstable. Either Father and Son are distinct individuals who are both God in the way that two horses are horses, in which case there are two Gods, or else Father and Son are distinct individuals which share a common essence, like two branches growing out of a common trunk. Thus, either the oneness or simplicity of God is compromised.

XIV. And when we advance this objection against them, What do you mean to say then? That the Son is not properly God, just as a picture of an animal is not properly an animal? And if not properly God, in what sense is He God at all? They reply, Why should not these terms be ambiguous, and in both cases be used in a proper sense? And they will give us such instances as the land-dog and the dogfish; where the word Dog is ambiguous, and yet in both cases is properly used, for there is such a species among the ambiguously named, or any other case in which the same appellative is used for two things of different nature. But, my good friend, in this case, when you include two natures under the same name, you do not assert that either is better than the other, or that the one is prior and the other posterior, or that one is in a greater degree and the other in a lesser that which is predicated of them both, for there is no connecting link which forces this necessity upon them. One is not a dog more than the other, and one less so; either the dogfish more than the land-dog, or the land-dog than the dogfish. Why should they be, or on what principle? But the community of name is here between things of equal value, though of different nature. But in the case of which we are speaking, you couple the Name of God with adorable Majesty, and make It surpass every essence and nature (an attribute of God alone), and then you ascribe this Name to the Father, while you deprive the Son of it, and make Him subject to the Father, and give Him only a secondary honour and worship; and even if in words you bestow on Him one which is Equal, yet in practice you cut off His Deity, and pass malignantly from a use of the same Name implying an exact equality, to one which connects things which are not equal. And so the pictured and the living man are in your mouth an apter illustration of the relations of Deity than the dogs which I instanced. Or else you must concede to both an equal dignity of nature as well as a common name — even though you introduced these natures into your argument as different; and thus you destroy the analogy of your dogs, which you invented as an instance of inequality. For what is the force of your instance of ambiguity, if those whom you distinguish are not equal in honour? For it was not to prove an equality but an inequality that you took refuge in your dogs. How could anybody be more clearly convicted of fighting both against his own arguments, and against the Deity?

XV. And if, when we admit that in respect of being the Cause the Father is greater than the Son, they should assume the premiss that He is the Cause by Nature, and then deduce the conclusion that He is greater by Nature also, it is difficult to say whether they mislead most themselves or those with whom they are arguing. For it does not absolutely follow that all that is predicated of a class can also be predicated of all the individuals composing it; for the different particulars may belong to different individuals. For what hinders me, if I assume the same premiss, namely, that the Father is greater by Nature, and then add this other, Yet not by nature in every respect greater nor yet Father — from concluding, Therefore the Greater is not in every respect greater, nor the Father in every respect Father? Or, if you prefer it, let us put it in this way: God is an Essence: But an Essence is not in every case God; and draw the conclusion for yourself — Therefore God is not in every case God. I think the fallacy here is the arguing from a conditioned to an unconditioned use of a term, to use the technical expression of the logicians. For while we assign this word Greater to His Nature viewed as a Cause, they infer it of His Nature viewed in itself. It is just as if when we said that such a one was a dead man they were to infer simply that he was a Man.

SN: Gregory once again seems not to have understood the argument. If fire is hotter than ice because it melts it, and if fire melts ice by nature, then fire is by nature hotter than ice. If the Father is greater than the Son because he’s the cause of the Son, and if the Father is the cause of the Son by nature, then the Father is greater than the Son by nature. The inference seems to me to be valid.

XVI. How shall we pass over the following point, which is no less amazing than the rest? Father, they say, is a name either of an essence or of an Action, thinking to bind us down on both sides. If we say that it is a name of an essence, they will say that we agree with them that the Son is of another Essence, since there is but one Essence of God, and this, according to them, is preoccupied by the Father. On the other hand, if we say that it is the name of an Action, we shall be supposed to acknowledge plainly that the Son is created and not begotten. For where there is an Agent there must also be an Effect. And they will say they wonder how that which is made can be identical with That which made it. I should myself have been frightened with your distinction, if it had been necessary to accept one or other of the alternatives, and not rather put both aside, and state a third and truer one, namely, that Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action, most clever sirs. But it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father.

SN: Gregory here is speaking incoherently. It doesn’t make any sense to say that “Father” is the name of the relation that Father stands in to Son. In that case, what is the second “Father” in that sentence referring to? Who is the “Father” that stands in the relation called “Father” to the Son? If “Father” names the relation, then Gregory is saying that a relation stands in a relation to the Son. But this is nonsensical. Relations exist between things, as Aristotle knew well. The Father is the thing which stands in the relation of fatherhood or paternity to the Son. Novatian likewise concedes that the Father has to be first before he can be Father to the Son (On the Trinity 31; emphasis added). Being as an individual is prior to being related to another. In that case, “Father” cannot name the relation.

For as with us these names make known a genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they denote an identity of nature between Him That is begotten and Him That begets. 

SN: Once again, this is confused. First, it’s true that if we say “John is the father of Jack,” that discloses a relation that obtains between John and Jack. But John obviously has to be something more than that relation itself in order to stand in that relation to Jack. If John were nothing over and beyond this relation of paternity, then there would be no one to be Jack’s father. A pure relation can’t be Jack’s father. Second, it is obviously possible for “begetting” to be used in a metaphorical sense, as in the case of the coronation of the king (Ps. 2:7) or the election of Israel (Exod. 4:22; Hos. 11:1). Gregory’s argument is built on confusions and falsehoods.

But let us concede to you that Father is a name of essence, it will still bring in the idea of Son, and will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these names. 

SN: Once again, this is false. It’s possible that God is “Father” in the sense that he is the origin of everything else. This is a metaphorical use of the word “Father.” It doesn’t imply perfect consubstantiality between God and anything else. Alternatively, it could be that God is “Father” because everything really is consubstantial with him as a mode which he imposes on himself.

Let it be, if it so please you, the name of an action; you will not defeat us in this way either. The Homoousion would be indeed the result of this action, or otherwise the conception of an action in this matter would be absurd. You see then how, even though you try to fight unfairly, we avoid your sophistries. But now, since we have ascertained how invincible you are in your arguments and sophistries, let us look at your strength in the Oracles of God, if perchance you may choose to persuade us out of them.

XVII. For we have learned to believe in and to teach the Deity of the Son from their great and lofty utterances. And what utterances are these? These: God — The Word — He That Was In The Beginning and With The Beginning, and The Beginning. In the Beginning was The Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, [John 1:1] and With You is the Beginning, and He who calls her The Beginning from generations. [Isaiah 41:4]

SN: Gregory takes for granted a number of points that contemporary scholars may question, e.g. whether the Prologue of John’s Gospel does in fact express Jesus’s own words, or whether the Word in the Prologue is the same person as Jesus of Nazareth himself. This must be shown, not simply assumed. Though, it’s important to admit out of fairness for Gregory’s context that Gregory’s opponents would have shared these presuppositions of his.

Then the Son is Only-begotten: The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, it says, He has declared Him. [John 1:18] 

SN: Again, if Jesus is God’s Son in a metaphorical sense, then there is no implication of consubstantiality. Gregory takes for granted what must be proven, namely that God is in some literal sense Jesus’s Father. For example, when Nathaniel calls Jesus “God’s Son,” he means that he’s the king of Israel (John 1:49).

The Way, the Truth, the Life, the Light. I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life; and I am the Light of the World.

SN: The real question is whether Jesus is those things by nature or by grace. There is more than one way to have a property. Gregory simply assumes that Christ must be these things by nature, whereas that is the point that has to be proven.

Wisdom and Power, Christ, the Wisdom of God, and the Power of God. [1 Corinthians 1:24] 

SN: Gregory is only citing phrases without exegeting them in context. Paul means to say that Christ is the wisdom and power of God because God makes use of him to save us through his death on our behalf. This is compatible with Christ’s being merely a human being who plays a special role in God’s providence.

The Effulgence, the Impress, the Image, the Seal; Who being the Effulgence of His glory and the Impress of His Essence, and the Image of His Goodness, [Wisdom 7:26]

SN: This refers to God’s wisdom personified, not to Jesus. If there is a reference to Jesus, it is possible to understand it as metaphorical. Jesus is the embodiment of God’s wisdom in the same way as the Torah, but without being himself God or consubstantial with God (Sirach 24; Baruch 3–4). Or this may refer to Jesus after his resurrection, though not before.

and Him has God the Father sealed. [John 6:27] Lord, King, He That Is, The Almighty. 

SN: “Lord” and “king” are not titles indicative of divinity. Jesus is never called “he that is” in Revelation.

The Lord rained down fire from the Lord; [Genesis 19:24] 

SN: To my mind, this is a reference to lightning as “fire from the Lord.” There is no implication that there are two Lords.

and A sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Your Kingdom; and Which is and was and is to come, the Almighty [Revelation 1:8] 

SN: The passage from Revelation refers to God the Father, not to the Son.

— all which are clearly spoken of the Son, 

SN: This is false.

with all the other passages of the same force, none of which is an afterthought, or added later to the Son or the Spirit, any more than to the Father Himself. For Their Perfection is not affected by additions. There never was a time when He was without the Word, or when He was not the Father, or when He was not true, or not wise, or not powerful, or devoid of life, or of splendour, or of goodness.

SN: I don’t understand how Gregory selectively hypostasizes one property of God into a different person (“Word”) but not all the others, as in Gnosticism. I don’t think there’s a good reason not to. If one property is a person, then so are the rest.

But in opposition to all these, do you reckon up for me the expressions which make for your ignorant arrogance, such as My God and your God, or greater, or created, or made, or sanctified; Add, if you like, Servant [Philippians 2:7] and Obedient [Philippians 2:8] and Gave [John 1:12] and Learnt, [Hebrews 5:8] and was commanded, was sent, can do nothing of Himself, either say, or judge, or give, or will. And further these — His ignorance, [Mark 13:32] subjection, [1 Corinthians 15:28] prayer, [Luke 6:12] asking, [John 14:16] increase, [Luke 2:52] being made perfect. And if you like even more humble than these; such as speak of His sleeping, hungering, being in an agony, [Luke 22:44] and fearing; [Hebrews 5:7] or perhaps you would make even His Cross and Death a matter of reproach to Him. His Resurrection and Ascension I fancy you will leave to me, for in these is found something to support our position. 

SN: Nothing about Christ’s resurrection or ascension implies his consubstantiality with the Father. Otherwise, all human beings are consubstantial with the Father because they will be resurrected. Likewise, if Christ’s ascension into heaven proves his consubstantiality with the Father, then Elijah and Enoch are also consubstantial with the Father. But as a matter of fact, there is no logical relation at all between consubstantiality and resurrection or ascension.

A good many other things too you might pick up, if you desire to put together that equivocal and intruded god of yours, Who to us is True God, and equal to the Father. For every one of these points, taken separately, may very easily, if we go through them one by one, be explained to you in the most reverent sense, and the stumbling-block of the letter be cleaned away — that is, if your stumbling at it be honest, and not wilfully malicious. To give you the explanation in one sentence. What is lofty you are to apply to the Godhead, and to that Nature in Him which is superior to sufferings and incorporeal; but all that is lowly to the composite condition of Him who for your sakes made Himself of no reputation and was Incarnate — yes, for it is no worse thing to say, was made Man, and afterwards was also exalted.

SN: This explanation doesn’t work for a number of reasons.

First, nowhere in scripture is this rule ever explicated or mentioned. Nowhere in the Bible does it say that the Son was subordinate or inferior to God only with respect to his assumed humanity. Gregory is thus inventing a rule that the Bible itself never presents.

Second, this rule doesn’t actually solve the problem. You can’t be made what you already are, nor given what you already have. A dead person can’t be killed, and a burning home can’t be lit on fire. At best, a person can be made what he already is to a greater degree, or in a new way. But if Jesus were consubstantial with the Father, he would already have all-power, all-knowledge, all-wisdom, and all the rest. Thus, he couldn’t be made powerful, or grow in knowledge or wisdom, or raised to an exalted position, etc. He only could be made power or grow in wisdom in a different way than before, e.g. as incarnate. But the Bible never uses this kind of language.

Thus, Gregory’s theory is not supported by the text. He wants to impose rules on the Bible—e.g., that when God is called the Father of Christ, this implies that they’re of the same nature; or what when Christ is said to be inferior to God in some way, it’s only with respect to his assumed humanity—rules which the text doesn’t support and actually contradicts.

The result will be that you will abandon these carnal and grovelling doctrines, and learn to be more sublime, and to ascend with His Godhead, and you will not remain permanently among the things of sight, but will rise up with Him into the world of thought, and come to know which passages refer to His Nature, and which to His assumption of Human Nature.

SN: Gregory has made up a rule that the Bible doesn’t support or reference and presented it as wisdom. I think it’s more honest to admit that his doctrine is simply not in the Bible. 

XIX. For He Whom you now treat with contempt was once above you. He Who is now Man was once the Uncompounded. What He was He continued to be; what He was not He took to Himself. 

SN: If Christ remained what he was, then he remained omnipotent, omniscient, immortal, and the rest even after becoming incarnate. How then can he die, if he’s immortal?

You cannot simply say that he dies “in his humanity,” because the Bible never says this.

If Christ is God and man, then he is something more than just his humanity. And if Christ the person is something more than his humanity, then either the humanity is a proper part of him (like a limb or organ) or else something outside of him (like a tool or instrument that he uses). But he wouldn’t have died just because a part of him died, just as a man hasn’t died just because his arm has gone necrotic or a tooth has rotted in his mouth. Neither would Christ have died just because the humanity he was using as a tool had died, just like a man doesn’t die just because the hammer he is using breaks in his hand.

Gregory’s proposed solution therefore does not accomplish anything. If Christ remains immortal after the incarnation, then he can’t die. If he does die, then he didn’t remain immortal, contrary to what Gregory said, or else was never immortal because he was never consubstantial with the Father.

In the beginning He was, uncaused; for what is the Cause of God?

SN: This seems contrary to what Gregory said earlier about the Father being the cause of the Son.

But afterwards for a cause He was born. And that cause was that you might be saved, who insult Him and despise His Godhead, because of this, that He took upon Him your denser nature, having converse with Flesh by means of Mind. While His inferior Nature, the Humanity, became God, because it was united to God,

SN: In what sense is union transformative? Does a hammer become human because a human begins to use it? Does it become canine if a dog takes it into its mouth? Perhaps in some metaphorical sense, this would be acceptable. But there is a more literal sense in which a hammer is not human but simply a hammer, even if it’s being used by a human being. Perhaps if a hammer could be integrated into a person’s body, then it would become human in the way that any of a person’s organs are “human,” i.e. human in the sense of being part of a human. But God is supposed to be immutable. He cannot change. In that case, he cannot come to integrate a created thing into his own being like that. So, it’s simply not true that the humanity becomes God simply because it’s united to God.

and became One Person because the Higher Nature prevailed in order that I too might be made God so far as He is made Man. He was born — but He had been begotten: He was born of a woman— but she was a Virgin. The first is human, the second Divine.

SN: There is nothing about the virgin birth that implies that Jesus is divine. He could simply have been a human being miraculously conceived.

In His Human nature He had no Father, but also in His Divine Nature no Mother. Both these belong to Godhead. He dwelt in the womb — but He was recognized by the Prophet, himself still in the womb, leaping before the Word, for Whose sake He came into being. He was wrapped in swaddling clothes [Luke 2:41] — but He took off the swathing bands of the grave by His rising again. 

SN: He can have taken off the “swathing bands of the grave” even if he were simply a human being raised from the dead by God. This doesn’t prove his divinity.

He was laid in a manger—but He was glorified by Angels, and proclaimed by a star, and worshipped by the Magi. 

SN: This is compatible with his being a special human being. It doesn’t prove he’s consubstantial with the Father.

Why are you offended by that which is presented to your sight, because you will not look at that which is presented to your mind? He was driven into exile into Egypt—but He drove away the Egyptian idols. 

SN: A human being specially empowered and authorized by God can have done that.

He had no form nor comeliness in the eyes of the Jews [Isaiah 53:2]—but to David He is fairer than the children of men. And on the Mountain He was bright as the lightning, and became more luminous than the sun, [Matthew 17:2] initiating us into the mystery of the future.

SN: Once again, all this is compatible with his being human by nature and divine only by grace.

XX. He was baptized as Man — but He remitted sins as God

SN: The text never says that he remitted sins as God. Matt. 9:8 suggests that Christ’s authority to forgive sins was an authority given to human beings. Christ also authorizes his disciples to forgive sins (John 20:23). This doesn’t mean they are divine.

—not because He needed purificatory rites Himself, but that He might sanctify the element of water.

SN: The text doesn’t say this. Gregory has invented this explanation from his own mind.

He was tempted as Man, but He conquered as God; yea, He bids us be of good cheer, for He has overcome the world. [John 16:33] 

SN: The text never says that he overcame temptation as God. To the contrary, Heb. 5:8–9 says that Christ learned obedience through his sufferings and was made perfect. If he was divine, he couldn’t learn anything or be made perfect, because he would already know everything and already be made perfect. The text doesn’t say that he learned or was made perfect in his humanity.

He hungered—but He fed thousands; yea, He is the Bread that gives life, and That is of heaven. He thirsted—but He cried, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me and drink. Yea, He promised that fountains should flow from them that believe. He was wearied, but He is the Rest of them that are weary and heavy laden. [Matthew 11:28]

SN: This is compatible with his being made to be such by God as a matter of grace. It doesn’t prove that Jesus is divine by nature.

He was heavy with sleep, but He walked lightly over the sea. He rebuked the winds, He made Peter light as he began to sink. He pays tribute, but it is out of a fish; yea, He is the King of those who demanded it. [John 19:19] 

SN: None of this proves Jesus’s divinity. At best, it proves that God was with him and working miracles through him as a way of attesting to him (Acts 2:22, 10:38).

He is called a Samaritan and a demoniac;—but He saves him that came down from Jerusalem and fell among thieves; the demons acknowledge Him, and He drives out demons and sinks in the sea legions of foul spirits, [Luke 8:28-33] and sees the Prince of the demons falling like lightning.

SN: This is compatible with his being a human being specially used by God.

He is stoned, but is not taken. He prays, but He hears prayer. He weeps, but He causes tears to cease. He asks where Lazarus was laid, for He was Man; but He raises Lazarus, for He was God. [John 11:43] 

SN: Gregory might as well argue that Elijah and Elisha were God because they raised dead people too. But the text explains that they were by nature human beings who were specially used by God and empowered by his Spirit. That’s also what the Bible says about Jesus (Acts 10:38). 

He is sold, and very cheap, for it is only for thirty pieces of silver; [Matthew 26:15] but He redeems the world, and that at a great price, for the Price was His own blood. [1 Peter 1:19] 

SN: That’s because God gave Christ this role in his providence. It doesn’t prove his divinity.

As a sheep He is led to the slaughter, [Isaiah 53:7] but He is the Shepherd of Israel, and now of the whole world also.

SN: He is the shepherd appointed by God (Heb. 1:2). If he’s been appointed to this role, it doesn’t belong to him originally. And if it doesn’t belong to him originally, then he’s not divine by nature, but only by grace.

As a Lamb He is silent, yet He is the Word, and is proclaimed by the Voice of one crying in the wilderness. [John 1:23] 

SN: Jesus does not call himself the Word in John’s Gospel. It’s also not obvious that he is the Word except in a metaphorical sense, just as the Torah was said to be God’s wisdom (Sirach 24; Baruch 3–4).

He is bruised and wounded, but He heals every disease and every infirmity. [Isaiah 53:23] 

SN: Very many people today pray to Jesus for healing and are not healed.

He is lifted up and nailed to the Tree, but by the Tree of Life He restores us; yea, He saves even the Robber crucified with Him; [Luke 23:43] yea, He wrapped the visible world in darkness.

SN: The text doesn’t say that Jesus caused the darkness at his crucifixion.

He is given vinegar to drink mingled with gall. Who? He who turned the water into wine [John 2:1-11], who is the destroyer of the bitter taste, who is Sweetness and altogether desire. [Song of Songs 5:16] 

SN: This proves nothing.

He lays down His life, but He has power to take it again; [John 10:18] 

SN: Jesus can have been speaking figuratively or exaggerating. He can take it up again because he’s confident that God will raise him from the dead. Alternatively, he’s confident that he will never die because God is his Father and thus will always be with him. But this is a relation to God that he can have by grace and not necessarily by nature. Or even if he has this relation to God by nature, it’s possible that this is a relation which obtains between God and all people. It’s just that Jesus alone is aware of this.

and the veil is rent, for the mysterious doors of Heaven are opened; the rocks are cleft, the dead arise. [Matthew 27:51] He dies, but He gives life, and by His death destroys death. He is buried, but He rises again; He goes down into Hell, but He brings up the souls; He ascends to Heaven, and shall come again to judge the quick and the dead, and to put to the test such words as yours. If the one give you a starting point for your error, let the others put an end to it.

SN: Jesus does very many impressive things that indicate that God’s power and authority are at work through him. But this doesn’t mean that he’s divine by nature. It’s just as possible that he’s a human being specially empowered and used by God for various purposes.

XXI. This, then, is our reply to those who would puzzle us; not given willingly indeed (for light talk and contradictions of words are not agreeable to the faithful, and one Adversary is enough for us),

SN: Gregory falsely presents himself as though he didn’t actually enjoy speaking ad nauseam and presenting weak arguments against opponents whose intelligence and faithfulness he constantly denigrates.

but of necessity, for the sake of our assailants (for medicines exist because of diseases), that they may be led to see that they are not all-wise nor invincible in those superfluous arguments which make void the Gospel. 

SN: Gregory doesn’t take seriously the possibility that he might be wrong. He is always talking down to his opponents, as if they’re clearly in the wrong and braying like donkeys. He lacks critical self-awareness.

For when we leave off believing, and protect ourselves by mere strength of argument, and destroy the claim which the Spirit has upon our faith by questionings, and then our argument is not strong enough for the importance of the subject (and this must necessarily be the case, since it is put in motion by an organ of so little power as is our mind), what is the result? The weakness of the argument appears to belong to the mystery, and thus elegance of language makes void the Cross, as Paul also thought. [1 Corinthians 1:17] For faith is that which completes our argument. 

SN: Gregory admits that his arguments are weak. As a matter of fact, they are fallacious and grounded on false premises. He says that faith makes up for the weakness of argument. But how do you know that you have the right faith? Once again, Gregory shows no critical self-awareness. He takes for granted that he’s right, and if he can’t prove it, then that’s because the mind is too weak for the Spirit’s mysteries. But the question would be, How do you know that the Spirit teaches what you believe at all, especially if the arguments in its favor are so weak? Gregory’s argument here is embarrassingly circular. 

But may He who proclaims unions and looses those that are bound, and who puts into our minds to solve the knots of their unnatural dogmas, if it may be, change these men and make them faithful instead of rhetoricians, Christians instead of that which they now are called. 

SN: Gregory says that his opponents are not real Christians, even despite the fact that they believe in Jesus and want to be faithful to him and to what the New Testament teaches about him. But Gregory’s arguments all range from the poor to the very poor. He’s a table-pounder.

This indeed we entreat and beg for Christ’s sake. Be reconciled to God, [2 Corinthians 5:20] and quench not the Spirit; [1 Thessalonians 5:19] or rather, may Christ be reconciled to you, and may the Spirit enlighten you, though so late. But if you are too fond of your quarrel, we at any rate will hold fast to the Trinity, and by the Trinity may we be saved, remaining pure and without offense, until the more perfect showing forth of that which we desire, in Him, Christ our Lord, to Whom be the glory forever. Amen.

SN: How does Gregory know that the Spirit is not trying to speak through his opponents, who are pointing out the illogicality and scriptural unfoundedness of Gregory’s doctrine? Gregory seems to take for granted that of course the Spirit would not disagree with him. In that case, he’s not a serious thinker. He’s a dogmatist.